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The aim of this report is to share insights
from the California experience with advocates,
program operators, and state agency, school
and political officials in other states who are
contemplating an expansion of afterschool
programs.
This report is the result of a desire by the
William T. Grant Foundation to capture a
unique process and opportunity – the planning
for the largest expansion of state-funded
afterschool programs in the nation’s history.
This report covers the time period from
summer 2005 to late summer 2006 when
legislation sets the stage for the implementation
of Proposition 49, which funds afterschool
programs for elementary and middle school
students.
The information for this report was
collected principally in three ways:
l Documents generated during the planning
process.
l Observations during meetings of two key
groups. 
l The Design Team: This group was
comprised of state agency officials,
program operators, advocates and
employees of a consulting firm. This team
produced 19 recommendations on how to
implement Proposition 49.
l The Before & After School Advisory
Committee: This committee was created
by the California legislature. One of its
roles is to review the work of the Design
Team and make recommendations to state
agencies, the governor and the legislature
on how to implement Proposition 49.
l Interviews with 15 people involved in the
process. These people were chosen to serve as
archetypes because their point of view
represents large numbers of stakeholders.
This report addresses two major issues that
drove the planning for the rollout of
Proposition 49.
The first is the extraordinary expansion of
a state-funded program. The number of sites
would increase from 1,700 to 4,000; an
additional 16,000 new afterschool staffers
would be needed.
The second issue revolves around the
decision by a consortium of foundations to pay
for a private consulting firm to work with state
agencies, advocates and program operators to
create a master plan. This yeasty mix – non-
profits, business and bureaucracy – created
predictable cultural challenges when the main
sectors of American working life team up to
tackle a big job.
Real answers to what worked in the
planning process and what didn’t will begin to
reveal themselves once Proposition 49 is fully
implemented. At that point, one will be able to
see which parts of the plan were implemented
and how well those plans succeeded in the
delivery of afterschool programs.
What follows is some navigational help for
readers: a timeline on key dates in the process
and a list of key people and organizations. 
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Introduction
The main elements of the report
include:
l A summary of key Take Aways from the
California experience for advocates and
planners in other states.
l A Chronicle of how the process
unfolded.
l A more detailed discussion of the four
Take Away areas.
 
KEY PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS
This is a list of key people and organizations in
this telling of the Proposition 49 story. Most of
the people listed here contributed to this report. 
l Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of
California.
l Office of the Secretary of Education
(OSE), a part of the governor’s 
administration. 
l Scott Himelstein, former acting 
secretary.
l The Department of Finance, which 
serves as the governor’s chief fiscal 
policy advisor.
l Jack O’Connell, Superintendent of Public
Instruction. This is a statewide elected 
position. 
l California Department of Education
(CDE). O’Connell is responsible for this
state agency.
l Sue Stickel, former Deputy
Superintendent of Public Instruction at
CDE; member of the Steering Committee.
l John Malloy, program consultant for
CDE; member of the Design Team.
l The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO). This a
non-partisan state office.
l The Boston Consulting Group (BCG). This
consulting firm was hired to help put 
together the master plan.
l Linda Segre, former vice president for
BCG based in the San Francisco office.
l Reggie Gilyard, a BCG vice president
based in the Los Angeles office.
l The David and Lucile Packard Foundation.
l Lois Salisbury, director of the
foundation’s Children, Families and
Communities Program.
l Julene Perez-Gonzalez, former program
officer.
l The Steering Committee. This group included
executives from the state, afterschool programs
and the consulting firm; its charge was to set
the course for the planning process.
l The Design Team. This group was charged
with handling the details of the plan. It was
comprised mostly of people from the
afterschool field, plus a few state officials, and
worked closely with the consultants.
l Before & After School Advisory Committee.
This group was created by the state legislature
and makes recommendations on policy and its
implementation to CDE, the governor’s office
and legislators. Its members are appointed by
the governor, legislators and the superintendent
of public instruction. This group picked up the
work of both the Steering and Design teams.
l Sandra McBrayer, Chief Executive Officer of
the Children’s Initiative in San Diego; chair of
both the Steering and Advisory committees.
l Carla Sanger, President and CEO of LA’s
BEST (Better Educated Students for
Tomorrow); member of the Steering and
Advisory committees.
l Steve Amick, Region 9 Lead at the San Diego
County Office of Education; member of the
Design Team and the Advisory Committee.
l Tim Erwin, Project Specialist for Newark
School District; member of the Design Team.
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l CynDee Zandes, former Director of Extended
Day Programs, Greenfield School District;
member of the Design Team.
l Sam Piha, former director of Community and
School Partnerships for the Community
Network for Youth Development; member of
the Design Team.
l Lindsay Callahan, former Program Director
for Community School Partnerships at
University of California, Davis; member of the
Design Team.
l Jennifer Peck, Executive Director for the Bay
Area Partnership for Children and Youth;
member of the Design Team.   
l Steve Fowler, grantee advising the Packard
Foundation.
l Perry Chen, grantee advising the Packard
Foundation.
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7This list of key dates will help readers 
understand how the planning process 
unfolded on Proposition 49.
Nov. 5, 2002: Proposition 49 passes.
Oct. 7, 2003: Gov. Gray Davis is recalled;
Arnold Schwarzenegger elected governor.
Spring, 2005: Revenue projections indicate
Proposition 49 money could be available in
the 2006/2007 fiscal year.
Summer, 2005: Experts from afterschool
field and representatives from foundations
meet in San Francisco to discuss planning.
Early August, 2005: Foundation executives
meet with state officials on idea of bringing
in a private consulting firm to assist the
state in planning for Proposition 49 rollout.
Mid-August, 2005: Request for proposals
goes out to consulting firms.
Sept. 28, 2005: Three consulting firms make
presentations in Sacramento.
Oct. 13, 2005: As a follow-up, the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG) meets with state
and foundation officials.
Oct. 20, 2005: The board of the David and
Lucile Packard Foundation approves hiring
private consulting firm. Pledges from other
foundations follow.
Nov. 1, 2005: BCG begins work.
Nov. 8, 2005: Statewide special election.
Voters reject four initiatives supported by
Gov. Schwarzenegger.
Nov. 10, 2005: BCG and state officials sign
a memo of understanding.
Nov. 28, 2005: Steering Committee meets
for the first time.
Dec. 1, 2005: Design Team meets for the
first time. It would meet several more times
over the next several months.
March 14, 2006: Final meeting of the
Design Team.
March 15, 2006: After School Summit,
Sacramento.
March 16, 2006: Before & After School
Advisory Committee begins reviewing work
of BCG and the Design Team.
May 17, 2006: Final report of BCG and the
Design Team is presented to the Advisory
Committee.
June 22, 2006: An Advisory subcommittee
begins work on identifying attributes that
contribute to quality programs.
Aug. 9, 2006: Senate Bill 638, which
includes several reforms, passes a key
Assembly committee.
Aug. 30-31, 2006: SB 638 passes the
Senate and Assembly.
Sept. 21, 2006: Gov. Schwarzenegger signs
SB 638. It goes into effect immediately.
Sept. 25, 2006: The request for proposals
goes out to schools.
Timeline
8It is too early to say, with any certainty,what aspects of the planning processdiscussed in this report can be deemed a
success. Only an assessment of the full
implementation of Proposition 49, which began
in late 2006 and early 2007, can tell that tale.
But there are some hints at issues afterschool
planners in other states should consider as they
think about planning an expansion. A
discussion of these items begins on page 26.
Summary of Key Take Aways
From California
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l The Basics: Research and Effective
Advocacy 
Summary: Advocacy efforts that had
been going on long before Proposition 49
planning began ensured that important
changes were made to the afterschool
program law to help make this
opportunity attractive to schools and their
subcontractors. 
Research and analysis done by the
consulting firm provided stakeholders
across the state with the clearest look yet
at the state of the afterschool field. This
step served to elevate the work of
planners and advocates.
Being armed with accurate, useful
information is critical to effective
advocacy and planning. Planners in other
states should note California’s successful
effort to understand the lay of the land
and ensure the program was attractive to
providers before jumping to the nuts and
bolts of rollout. 
l  Investment: Strategic Partnerships and
Early Buy-in 
Summary: It is critical to secure buy-in
from as many key partners as possible, as
early as possible. In the case of California,
the key partner was the California
Department of Education, the main state
education agency. But it was also critical
that other players like the Department of
Finance, the Office of the Secretary of
Education and the legislature be on board
and engaged. 
Deepening relationships with systems
and organizations outside of education
(e.g., juvenile justice, workforce, public
health) is a step many afterschool
stakeholders in California have come to
consider critical. Planners in other states
should consider whether education is
necessarily the most appropriate home for
afterschool initiatives or whether a
blended approach involving several public
funding streams could spark useful new
synergies.
l Group Dynamics: Utilizing Expertise and
Recognizing Limitations
Summary: Tapping expertise that exists
within the state among providers, agencies
and advocates and combining that with
outside advice proved to be a useful
strategy in California. The consulting
firm’s research and facilitation skills
complemented the expertise California
stakeholders brought to the table about the
afterschool field, its history and the state
context.
Clear communication and reporting
lines can help ensure the success of
bringing in external advisors. Identifying
early on the strengths and recognizing the
limitations that each party brings to the
table is also important. 
l Lasting Value: Defining, Creating and
Sustaining Quality Programs
Summary: The planning process
sparked a long overdue, nuanced
conversation within the state about the
purpose of afterschool programming and
about several key drivers of quality –
technical assistance, workforce
development and accountability. 
Developing consensus about what
constitutes quality and being clear about
what capacity currently exists when it
comes to monitoring and improving
quality at scale is critical. This evolving
conversation in California will ultimately
determine whether Proposition 49 delivers
on its full promise.
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About 500 business and communityleaders gathered for a luncheon onOct. 21, 2002, at the Beverly Hilton
Hotel. The topic was standard fare: afterschool
programs. The speaker was not.
Citizen Arnold Schwarzenegger delivered
this line with what the Los Angeles Times
called Terminator-like bravado: “This is the
best, safest, soundest initiative ever written, and
that’s why it’s going to succeed.”
The initiative, indeed, did succeed. A few
weeks later, more than 55 percent of California
voters approved the After School Education and
Safety Program Act of 2002, or Proposition 49.
For California, in terms of afterschool, the
stakes could not be higher. Proposition 49
mandated that $550 million each year should
be set aside from general fund revenues for
afterschool programs for kindergarteners
through ninth graders.
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This infusion of cash meant a four-fold
increase in state funds to reach children
between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. every school day.
The number of participating schools could
increase from 1,700 to 4,000.  
This puts California squarely in front of
the afterschool push. No state has made such a
large commitment.
By the summer of 2005, California’s
economy was rebounding and it seemed like
the way was clear for the expansion of 
afterschool in the 2006/2007 fiscal year.
But there were warning shots. The
Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), the
nonpartisan California equivalent of the
Congressional Budget Office, in 2004 had
advocated delaying or repealing Proposition
49. Its report was unsparing and there was
rumbling in the legislature.
The LAO report said that California, given
its structural budget deficit, could not afford to
pony up an automatic $550 million each year
for afterschool programs, particularly when
Proposition 49 funding may “crowd out” K-12
spending that is a higher priority. And, given
the track record of the existing program, the
“Proposition 49 funds are not likely to be spent
in a timely manner,’’ the report said.
There was a need for a plan. One of the
largest philanthropies in the country had an
idea: bring in a private consulting firm to help
create it.
Threads but no plan
Lois Salisbury can’t remember whether
she was going east or west, only that “it was a
long enough trip to write it and my computer
battery didn’t give out.”
In a dimly lit airplane cabin in the summer
of 2005, the director of the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation’s Children, Families and
Communities Program was pounding out the
formal document for a novel approach – a
request for a private consulting company to
help create a master plan for California’s state
agencies.
This unusual step was driven by a few
hard realities. Afterschool funding would
become available as early as July 2006.
Building Blocks
The Design Team and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) found several areas that
worked well in the California afterschool field.
Students: Students have a safe,
educational, and recreational place to go
after school where they can receive
academic assistance, enjoy exciting
activities, explore new ideas, and form
meaningful relationships with staff and
other students. There is research that has
shown that reduced grade retention and
drop out rates can be improved for kids
who participate in afterschool programs.
Parents: Afterschool programs ease the
burden of supervision between 3 p.m. and
6 p.m. for working parents and provide the
opportunity for students to finish homework
and receive tutoring. 
Staff: Such programs today create tens of
thousands of jobs that build leadership
skills and provide opportunities to make a
difference in the lives of youth.
Community: Afterschool programs
contribute to increased workplace
productivity and local economic
development.  Additionally, there is
reduced vandalism and juvenile crime, all
of which benefit the local community.
Source: Master Plan for California After-school
Programs, April 17, 2006
12
Lack of common direction for the
community and stakeholders: The
absence of a mission or long-term goals
for all of afterschool suggests insufficient
support and a lack of common
understanding between the community
and stakeholders. 
Unclear program expectations: There is
no consensus or clarity on definition of
quality or outcome measurements.
Beyond the CDE-required outcomes, there
is no consistent guidance on essential
components of programs across the state.
Gaps in technical assistance: Gaps in
provision of training and certain support
services as well as overlap in provision of
other assistance (e.g.multi-development of
databases and websites and various
technical assistance materials for the same
topics, such as start-up guides) create
inefficiencies and an opportunity to
optimize technical assistance. The
technical assistance system will also be
placed under severe pressure with the
onset of Proposition 49. Currently there is
no central place to find information on
technical assistance including timing and
location of training and technical
assistance materials.
Management and administration
inefficiencies: Systematic oversight of
student and school data is not easily
accessible today for key decision makers.
For example, information such as dates on
which grant award letters were sent are
not systematically tracked and reported.
No coordinated effort exists to identify and
provide additional assistance to unfunded
“needy” schools (i.e. entire system is a
“pull” rather than a “push” system).
Furthermore, some data still require
manual entry (e.g., attendance, grantee
information, etc.).
Continuing change to workforce: High
turnover in personnel exists due to
relatively lower pay, the part-time nature of
most positions and the transient nature of
the young adults that fill most positions.
Financial shortcomings: Approximately
30 percent of afterschool programs rate
the match requirement as a significant
challenge.
Source: Master Plan for California After-school
Programs, April 17, 2006
Areas for Improvement
The Design Team and The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) identified several areas in the
California afterschool environment that do not work particularly well.
Even though it had been three years since
the passage of Proposition 49, the state and the
field – mostly advocates and program
providers – were not ready for such a challenge
and opportunity. Everyone was surprised by a
resurgent California economy.
Proposition 49 required that state revenues
grow substantially before the $550 million
could be set aside each year for afterschool
expansion. The financial benchmark that would
trigger afterschool funds was on the “radar
screen of the whole field,” Salisbury said. In
2003 and 2004, when the state was struggling
with deficits, there was a “sense that this was
several years out.”
John Malloy, a program consultant for the
California Department of Education (CDE),
which would administer the program, said
everyone thought the Proposition 49 money
would be available in fiscal year 2007/2008.
“No one really thought the (financial)
trigger was going to come so soon,” Malloy
said.
In any event, long-range planning is not
the standard mode of operation for CDE. The
department is “so used to having things thrown
at them and dealing with what is immediately
in front of them,” Salisbury said. “By
government standards, a year to plan is a
luxury.”
The afterschool field, at best a loose
confederation of program directors and
advocates, lacked a statewide leadership
structure.
At a San Francisco meeting in the summer
of 2005 of experts in the field and
representatives from a few philanthropies, “it
became clear that neither the field nor the state
had the infrastructure in place to make a
dramatic expansion of afterschool happen,”
Salisbury said.
There were threads but only a loose fabric.
There were regional leads in place around the
state to provide technical assistance to program
providers. And there were several successful
community, school district, county and city
programs.
But there was “no coherent plan,
infrastructure or timeframe for an expansion of
this scale,” Salisbury said. “Everyone was
paying attention to their piece of the world.”
“Short-term issues were being identified,
but not in the context of a roadmap of where
the state needed to go with this opportunity
over 5 to 10 years,” she said.
Salisbury and Julene Perez-Gonzalez, a
Packard program officer, believed that using a
private company would jump-start the work. A
private firm working with state agencies would
appeal to other philanthropies as well as to
their board members, many of whom came
from the private sector.
The Atlantic Philanthropies and the Evelyn
and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund were both high on
the list of potential partners to support this
proposal. Atlantic was planning to be a big
investor in youth development issues and it
was on an aggressive track to pay out its
principal in 10 years. Salisbury hoped that the
director of youth development, Charles
Roussel, formerly an executive with Accenture,
would be interested in the private sector
approach. And the Haas fund had been long
interested in afterschool issues in California.
“The freshness of this would get
everyone’s attention,” Salisbury said. “This
would play well with all of the stakeholders.”
The biggest stakeholder of them all was
Schwarzenegger, now the Republican governor. 
The afterglow of the 2003 recall of Gov.
Gray Davis and Schwarzenegger’s promotion
from action hero to governor had worn off. The
new governor was pushing hard for four reform
proposals on the November 2005 ballot.
Proposition 49 was still his baby, and any deal
on planning would have to have his blessing.
In August 2005, the Packard folks sat down
with a few of the players, including Bonnie
Reiss, the governor’s long-time confidant on a
wide variety of issues.
Salisbury said the governor’s people were
“interested in collaborating with philanthropy.” 
Reiss and others were intrigued with the
idea of working with a management consulting
company, Salisbury said. They considered this
“out of the box…It was a provocative
suggestion.”
Sue Stickel, then the CDE’s deputy
superintendent, was at the meeting. She was
representing her boss, Superintendent of Public
Instruction Jack O’Connell.
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“The freshness of this would
get everyone’s attention. This
would play well with all of
the stakeholders.”
LOIS SALISBURY
PACKARD FOUNDATION
The Planners: Sept. 28, 2005
Representatives of three large U.S.
consulting firms each gave a 90-minute
presentation at the Office of the Secretary of
Education in Sacramento.
After the first round, the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG) was invited back for
a follow-up interview on Oct. 13.
“One of the reasons they were picked was
that everyone was impressed with their work in
Chicago on education policy,” said Salisbury.
The foundations would pay the bill of
more than $1 million but the client was the
state government, specifically, the California
Department of Education (CDE) and the Office
of the Secretary of Education (OSE).
This arrangement was not unprecedented
for philanthropy, Salisbury said. “Philanthropies
are frequently the brokers in these relationships.”
What was extraordinary was the speed and
intensity: an autumn 2005 start and a spring
2006 delivery of a plan for a rollout as soon as
mid-2006.
On Oct. 20, 2005, the Packard board’s
executive committee approved the project.
Later, Atlantic Philanthropies signed on, too.
Then the Stuart, Koret, Haas and Mott
foundations all pledged to help pay for BCG’s
work. The William T. Grant Foundation (which
commissioned this report) agreed to be a
‘‘backup’’ source. It was tapped later when
Mott dropped out.
This broad coalition of foundations would
prove useful as work went forward. When the
governor’s office later called for the process to
stop, the coalition was able to keep most of the
work on track.
BCG started in on the project on Nov. 1. A
memo of understanding, on BCG letterhead,
was signed 10 days later by Stickel from CDE,
Scott Himelstein from the OSE, and Linda
Segre, then a BCG vice president based in the
San Francisco office.
Segre saw an immediate difference in this
assignment with state agencies compared to
BCG’s work in cities on education and with its
corporate clients, too.
“I don’t have a single client,” she said in
an interview two months into the project. In
New Orleans and Chicago, there was one clear
leader so it was easier to “touch base. There are
a lot of stakeholders in this assignment.”
This lack of a single point of contact – a
champion, really – would prove to be a
problem later on, from BCG’s perspective.
Segre said she and her team had a good,
14
“We all recognized the enormity of the task
ahead of us,” she said. Stickel said she was “not
opposed to” bringing in a private company to
help create the master plan. 
There was great concern about the
interplay between the two executive branch
entities involved – the Office of the Secretary
of Education (OSE), under the control of the
GOP governor, and the CDE, headed by
O’Connell, a Democrat.
In a few weeks, there was an agreement to
move forward, but there was a strong
precondition: no partisan politics between the
governor’s office and CDE. They must agree to
not play politics with the Proposition 49 master
planning process.
The agreement held but it did not include
the legislature. That gap would prove to be a
lurking problem in the creation of a master
plan.
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even typical, corporate relationship with CDE
and Sue Stickel. But the communication was
difficult between the multiple state government
layers in play – Department of Finance,
Department of Education, Office of the
Secretary of Education, the governor’s office
and the legislature – due to busy schedules.
Five days after BCG began work, a special
election would ultimately add a level of
difficulty no one could foresee. The popular
governor turned out not to be so popular on
Nov. 5, 2005. His four initiatives, including
one to limit teacher tenure, would all fail badly.
BCG put its platoon of 20- and 30-
something analysts to work building a plan.
They sorted through existing information at
CDE and other sources; they did 140
interviews with program providers, state and
school district officials and regional leads, who
provide technical assistance to program
operators and schools from all over the state.
While BCG’s sponsor and paymaster was
the consortium of foundations and the client
the state’s education agencies, it shared the
workbench with two groups of experts from
the afterschool field and public policy.
l The Steering Committee was a group of
15 state and program executives and
policy makers charged with setting the
strategy and overall tone and direction for
the work. 
l The Design Team was made up mostly
of program operators with a sprinkling of
state officials in the afterschool offices.
The 18-member Design Team would do
the heavy lifting, addressing workforce,
technical assistance, program quality and
financial issues. 
The Steering Committee, at its first
meeting on Nov. 28, 2005, laid out these
objectives for “aspirational, yet practical” steps
toward achieving a workable master plan:
l Utilize and synthesize the vast
knowledge available today.
l Outline short- and long-term steps for
equitable access and consistent quality
and outcomes across the state, despite
differences among populations served.
l Ensure proper level of financial and
infrastructural support in place, including
programs, workforce, oversight and
administration.
l Define public vs. private roles and
interaction in a Proposition 49
implementation environment.
l Define and measure success.
Almost immediately, the Steering
Committee ran into trouble. An early meeting
was described as a dysfunctional family
Christmas, complete with insults and multiple
agendas. In the end, the Steering Committee
would meet only twice, leaving the work to the
Design Team.
The Design Team’s subcommittees pushed
15
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ahead, tackling workforce development,
financing, management, administration and the
execution of the plan.
All along, BCG was creating thick “decks”
of PowerPoint slides heavy with statistics,
analyses, charts, diagrams and scenarios. In
addition to the BCG interviews with 140
stakeholders, the raw data most often came
from the records of the CDE. 
For many Design Team members, it was
new information or, at the very least,
information put into a broader, more useful
context.
While BCG’s analysis would come under
some fire later on, during this period the
Design Team members and others were
pleased. 
“The depth of analysis from BCG is a
pleasant surprise, as is the energy and
eagerness they are bringing to the project,” said
Steve Fowler, a consultant advising Packard. 
Design Team members often echoed
Fowler’s sentiments: “When I ask a question,”
commented Design Team member Dick
Roberts of Los Angeles Unified School
District, “I get four pages of research.”
Featured in these “decks” were useful
insights:
l About 1,400 needy schools – defined as
having at least half of their students
eligible for free or reduced lunches – did
not receive any state or federal funding
for afterschool.
l One in three elementary and middle
schools received state or federal
afterschool funding.
l Participation among middle and junior
high students was lower than average.
l Seven rural counties had no programs.
Yet several rural counties, including some
neighbors to the no-program counties,
reported good participation among
schools in either a state or federal
program; in three rural counties all of the
schools were offering afterschool
programs.  
l Among urban counties, more than 69
percent of schools in a cluster of four
Bay-area counties – Contra Costa, Marin,
Santa Cruz and San Francisco – provided
afterschool programs. 
l In San Diego, all schools offered
afterschool – the result of the 6 to 6
campaign. The extended school-day
program is available in every public
elementary and middle school.
l The greatest need for afterschool
programs tended to be in Los Angeles, the
areas east of the city and in the Central
Valley.
BCG’s interviews also revealed several
key barriers to implementation of Proposition
49, including:
l The match requirement. The current law
required that for every dollar received
from the state, the schools had to raise 50
cents in cash or in-kind services.
l The size of the grants. They were
capped at $5 per student/per day, $50,000
for an elementary school and $75,000 for
a middle school.
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“When I ask 
a question,
I get four pages 
of research.”
DICK ROBERTS,
A DESIGN TEAM MEMBER
l Grant writing and distribution of funds.
The current model was a reimbursement
system. So, schools had to provide their
own start-up funds and then bill the state.
Steve Amick, a member of the Design
Team who works as a regional lead in the
San Diego County Office of Education,
likened this system to “qualifying for your
unemployment check as soon as you
demonstrate that you have a job.”
l Rural districts had special concerns
about finding qualified afterschool
workers and transportation. Rural schools
needed funding for a late bus to take the
students home at 6 p.m.
l CDE’s capacity and systems to handle
such a large increase in a program. The
CDE traditionally did not have a good
track record of delivering promised
revenue in a timely manner, said Carla
Sanger, CEO of LA’s BEST and a
member of the Steering and Advisory
committees. 
Agency buy-in
One area of concern from the start was the
buy-in from CDE people, who would have to
implement the plan. After all, it was their pool
everyone was playing in. Ultimately,
Proposition 49 would be their program.
CynDee Zandes, a Design Team member
who ran afterschool programs for a
Bakersfield-area school district, recalled that at
the first meeting the CDE representatives were
late – and the meeting was at CDE offices in
Sacramento.
While there were “segments of goodwill”
there was still plenty of “pride, self and ego” in
the room. CDE was keeping information
tightly held and not soliciting advice from
people in the field, she said.
These signals, to Zandes, underscored
CDE’s reluctance to the whole process and
particularly BCG’s role. “It wasn’t a CDE
party.”
The second meeting was at a BCG office –
neutral ground. No one was “accusatory,” and
people were committed to the “real task” of
designing a plan, Zandes said. By the third
meeting, the group began to hit its stride. CDE
was more on board, she said. The focus was on
the work, not the parochial issues that drive all
the stakeholders. By the fourth meeting, two
months into the project, the transformation, in
her view, was complete. CDE was on board.
There was an “ebb and flow” that felt right.
Others in the process, including Sandy
McBrayer, the chair of the Steering and
Advisory committees, agreed that CDE was at
first cool to the idea of bringing in BCG and
experts from the field. But they warmed to the
idea by the winter of 2006.
Sue Stickel, the former deputy
superintendent at CDE who sat on the Steering
Committee, personally felt challenged by the
time the planning demanded. She was
unwilling to break previous commitments in
order to go to Proposition 49 meetings. She
said people would pressure her to come to
these meetings by saying things like “you need
to make it a priority.” What they didn’t
understand, she said, is that she had many
other commitments in addition to Proposition
49 planning.
17
The old funding system
was like “qualifying 
for your unemployment
check as soon 
as you demonstrate that you
have a job.”
STEVE AMICK, 
A DESIGN TEAM MEMBER
Afterschool planning was hardly the only
item on the CDE agenda. While $550 million
is an enormous amount of money for
afterschool programs, it represents about one
percent of what the state spends on education.
Stickel was generally accessible when a
question came up and attended key meetings,
said BCG’s Segre. People from the governor’s
Office of Education, the other signatory to the
memo of understanding, were not as engaged,
Segre said.
Scott Himelstein, the former acting
secretary, said that is a fair assessment since
“all of the dollars flow through” CDE.
Fowler, the consultant, noted at the time
that “there is activity on a lot of levels – the
political process is moving forward, the master
planning is moving forward, each of the
constituencies is acting predictably,” he said. 
“It is not unlike building a plane while in
flight.”
Zandes, and others on the Design Team,
gave BCG’s people credit for driving the
process and avoiding the “meet, reflect, meet,
reflect and not go anywhere” syndrome that
infects many education initiatives.
But to others, some key issues were
becoming victims to time pressures. Fowler
noted that questions like, “Where do we want
to be in 2020?” were not being asked.
Malloy, a consultant for CDE, said that
BCG was at a disadvantage. “They are being
asked to do long-term planning, but it is really
crisis planning,” he said.
Outcomes and quality
One area where there was rising tension
was program outcomes and quality – in effect,
what does the state want the program to
deliver?
Prior to summer 2006, standardized test
scores were, by default, the measurement.
Even though, it is worth noting, the state had
never denied funding for an afterschool
program whose children’s test scores were
inadequate.
There was an ongoing conflict between
some in the youth development community
and the CDE over test scores being a
component of the measures.
To make afterschool programs accountable
for test scores is wrongheaded, argued the
youth development advocates on the Design
Team. That is the job of the schools, not the
afterschool program. 
Plus, an afterschool program is a good
opportunity to attract “disengaged” kids, said
Sam Piha, formerly of the Community
Network for Youth Development in San
Francisco and a member of the Design Team.
How do you attract kids if you are offering
algebra tutoring?
Piha and others argued that there were
other measures that could be used. For
instance, there is evidence that an afterschool
program can increase school-day attendance.
Homework completion and a decrease in anti-
social behavior are other measures that should
be considered. There needs to be a reasonable
expectation of what can be achieved by
afterschool programs, Piha said. “Put the bar
where it needs to be.”
From the CDE perspective, test scores are
how people “judge our work,’’ said CDE
consultant Malloy. He noted the irony that
many in the education community, including
CDE, opposed the movement toward
standardized test scores. Even though “we lost
that one” CDE was now in the position to
enforce it, Malloy said.
Others, most notably McBrayer, the chair
of the Steering Committee, sympathized with
the CDE point of view. Test scores have to be
part of the metrics because it’s “CDE’s
money,” and the department’s charge is
improving academic achievement, she said.
Test scores are “tied to academics. We need to
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have academic support in real time,” McBrayer
said.
Political football
To the afterschool community, there was
not a bigger issue than Proposition 49 and its
implementation.  And, it turned out,
Proposition 49 was just big enough to become
a player in a larger political drama. 
To many working on the plan, this was a
source of frustration. To others, it was a signal
that afterschool was no longer a backburner
issue. $550 million has a way of elevating an
issue’s profile.
It was enough money to make not only a
difference to kids and schools but to politicians
looking to rein in the budget.
The master planning for afterschool would
find itself on a stage with a back story – a deal
and dispute over K-12 education.
The deal was cut in 2003, in the first few
weeks of the new Schwarzenegger
administration. The governor negotiated a deal
with the California Teacher’s Association
(CTA) to set aside $2 billion in K-12 education
funding, guaranteed under the formulas in
Proposition 98. This extraordinary deal, said
the Los Angeles Times, “would give him a
one-year cushion as he tried to reduce a $16
billion deficit.”
Schwarzenegger had played ball before
with the CTA, one of the state’s most potent
political forces. In 2002, he had worked with
CTA staff to write Proposition 49 “so that its
funding stream would not interfere with
Proposition 98,” the Times said.
The dispute began in the fall of 2004,
when the governor was feeling trapped by his
deal with the CTA and the Proposition 98
formulas. The state’s economy was growing
and, under the formulas, the Proposition 98
guarantee was going to be $1.8 billion higher
than when he made his deal a year earlier. 
If he restored the $2 billion he had
promised, he would have to cut health and
welfare funding, according to the Times. The
governor chose to not pay back the $2 billion
immediately. 
Adding to the tension between the
teacher’s union and the governor’s office was a
series of initiatives for voters to consider in
November 2005. The initiatives included
proposals to lengthen the probation period for
new teachers and restrict the ability of unions
to use their members’ dues for political
purposes.
Just as the Proposition 49 master planning
process was getting underway, voters soundly
rejected the governor’s plan.
The weakness of the governor gave the
Democrats in the legislature a chance to push
their agenda, particularly the full funding of K-
12 education. The first challenge came from an
unlikely source. 
Sen. Tom Torlakson, a former science
teacher and supporter of Proposition 49, was
carrying a bill that many counted on to make
Proposition 49 workable – and solve some of
the problems identified by the Legislative
Analyst’s Office (LAO) and advocates. The
Torlakson bill would shelve the reimbursement
system and raise per student/per day rates –
issues well known to the afterschool providers
and confirmed in BCG’s 140 interviews around
the state.
But Torlakson was also considering a
constitutional amendment to repeal or delay
Proposition 49 funding.
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The argument for delay was not new. The
LAO had made the same point in 2004. The
state could not, right now, afford the $550
million a year for afterschool, particularly
when Proposition 98 – the money for K-12 –
was not fully funded.
While there had been great pains taken to
include the CDE and the governor’s office in
the planning process, representatives from the
legislature were largely absent.
The lack of legislative groundwork set the
stage for some missteps at a time when
Proposition 49 was hanging in the political
balance.
Long before the planning process began,
advocates had pushed hard for some key
reforms to the law, most notably a change in
the way the state’s afterschool contracts were
administered and an increase in the per
student/per day rate.                                      
The planning process was separate from
lobbying, which is off-limits for the
foundations. Still, the legislative and planning
tracks informed one another. And in one case
the two tracks collided, leaving some with hard
feelings.
The significance of the missteps that
followed is a matter of some debate. To some,
it was a blip; to others it endangered passage of
key afterschool reforms. 
To some program operators and advocates,
including McBrayer of the Children’s Initiative
in San Diego, Sanger of LA’s Best, and
Jennifer Peck of the Bay Area Partnership,
BCG overreached by what they saw as pushing
a funding scenario that they say endangered
carefully negotiated deals with legislators.
To others, including Segre of BCG and
Salisbury and Perez-Gonzalez of Packard, the
consulting company was simply laying out
scenarios for stakeholders to consider and not
advocating a position. In Segre’s view, BCG
was doing what it did best – providing an
“unbiased, objective point of view.” Politics is
not BCG’s expertise and lobbying is beyond
the scope of the foundations.  
The critical issue was the per day rate for
each student. A consensus among advocates
and program operators had been building for
more than a year that $7.50 per student/per day
was the minimum needed to operate a good
program. The higher rate would push the per-
school caps to $112,500 for elementary schools
and $150,000 for middle schools. (The existing
program caps were $5 per student/per day, and
$50,000 for elementary schools and $75,000
for middle schools.)
The higher rates, given the fixed total of
$550 million, also meant the program would
fall far short of being universal.
Proposition 49 was sold to voters as a
universal program, but many in Sacramento
and in the field embraced a phase-in plan that
grandfathered in existing programs and gave
needy schools first shot at the money. 
Proposition 49 would also enable the state
to use federal 21st Century funds, when
existing programs expired, for high school
programs.
“All the stakeholders were OK with
prioritization,” said Peck, a Design Team
member whose organization was a co-sponsor
of the Torlakson bill.
BCG consultants kept putting scenarios on
the table, including one with a lower per
student/per day figure. With that scenario, the
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program would reach more schools – making it
closer to a universal program. 
McBrayer said this independent analysis
caused problems early on in negotiations with
legislators. There was an accusation from one
legislative office of “hoodwinking” legislators
with these differing numbers, she said.
BCG “pushed back on issues where they
had no expertise,” Peck said. “They kept
mentioning all this research. There was a
presumption of expertise.” 
In McBrayer’s view, BCG essentially
overreached. “They are not the experts,” she
said. BCG’s consultants made assumptions on
situations they didn’t understand. Their overall
lack of knowledge of afterschool, the
stakeholders, the legislative process and the
policy situation made the process more
difficult, she said. Himelstein agreed that BCG
“didn’t seem skilled in dealing with public
entities.”
In Segre’s view, BCG did not advocate a
particular position but simply pushed for a
“rigorous look at the data.”
At the same time, BCG was not aware that
a deal was already in the works with the
administration on the $7.50 per student/per day
figure, Segre said.
This was another example, from BCG’s
perspective, of not having the access it needed
to key information and legislative staff.  So
when the firm acted on limited information, it
said it was unfairly accused of being naïve.
These tensions came to a head in early
March. During what Stickel called one of the
“ugliest days,” Department of Finance officials
were “completely unwilling to give up control”
for design of the program to the Design Team
and BCG.
So, the planning for afterschool gave way
to the real world of politics. “What we needed
from the legislature (on other issues) was more
important than the master planning process,”
Stickel said.
At the request of the governor’s office and
CDE, the scope of the planning was narrowed
to recommendations in three areas: program
quality and outcomes, workforce development
and matching funds. The foundation
consortium was able to help keep these key
items in play.
The financial plan, including the rates and
how the money would be disbursed, and the
test score question would be handled by
legislators and the governor’s office.
To Salisbury, from Packard, the political
machinations were a “dust up” that did not
derail the momentum created by the Design
Team/BCG work. The bulk of the work would
go forward.
These troubles underscored the “extra-
governmental” nature of the planning process,
said Fowler, a former Nebraska legislator.
While the process was not “negotiations on
napkins,” it still was viewed as a threat to the
legislature and some in the administration.
The planners’ work, in Fowler’s view, was
“demoted from a master plan to a planning
conversation.”
Ides of March
Three days in the middle of March served
as the transition period from planning to
preparing for implementation.
l On Tuesday, March 14, at their last
meeting, Design Team members were
officially told of the narrower scope of the
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About 1,200
afterschool advocates
attended the summit; 
it was probably 
the largest gathering 
ever for the field.
planning work. An ambitious series of
road shows around the state would be
cancelled, so the planning work would not
get the public vetting many thought it
needed.
While some members were unhappy
about their roles being short circuited,
McBrayer noted later that some
“legislators were offended. You think you
just get to decide” without the legislature
weighing in?
l The next day, about 1,200 afterschool
advocates and school officials gathered at
the Sacramento Convention Center for the
After School Summit. This is likely the
largest gathering on afterschool in the
nation’s history. “Usually, it is 200 to 300
people in a hotel ballroom, not more than
a 1,000 in a convention center,” Fowler
said.
The Democratic state Superintendent of
Schools, Jack O’Connell, was on the stage
along with the father of Proposition 49,
GOP Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. The
summit was an indicator on “how far
California has come,” Fowler said.
l On March 16, the Before & After
School Advisory Committee met to pick
up the work of the Steering Committee –
and turn the focus toward implementation.
McBrayer would be the chair of this
advisory group, which was created by the
legislature. In the coming weeks, BCG
and the Design Team would put the
finishing touches on recommendations on
outcomes and quality, workforce
development and matching funds.
The threat of a constitutional amendment
to delay or repeal Proposition 49 had
dissipated. Yet there was still no consensus on
new legislation to fix the implementation
problems and define the qualities of afterschool
programs, including the role of test scores. The
political forces that had made afterschool a
political football still were in play in an
election year – a tight budget and the ongoing
dispute between teachers and the governor.
There was a consensus, at least on the
Advisory Committee, that the worst-case
scenario was the existing law. 
The Advisory Committee voted to support
a GOP bill – a rival to Torlakson’s bill – that
cited test scores as the only outcome. But this
bill lacked support in committee and ended up
on the suspension calendar, one step from
dead.
But most of the Advisory Committee’s
attention was on the work of BCG and the
Design Team. McBrayer made it clear that the
Advisory Committee might not agree to all of
the recommendations and would need several
meetings to review, prioritize and make
decisions on the BCG/Design Team work.
Windfall
There was an emerging opportunity for the
Advisory committee to put the work of BCG
and the Design Team to use. While the
Republican bill was on the shelf, the
Democratic bill carried by Torlakson was
moving ahead.
In the Torlakson bill there was a menu of
outcome measures, including test scores, that
schools could choose to use to measure
success. 
The governor’s office, in a compromise
with advocates, agreed to drop the requirement
that test scores be the primary measure in
determining renewal of a three-year grant. The
governor very much wants Proposition 49
“checks out the door, serving kids by
November” when he is up for re-election, Peck
said. (Schwarzenegger did not highlight
afterschool programs in his successful re-
election campaign.)
After this compromise was brokered, the
legislature and the governor were looking for
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guidance. A subcommittee of the Advisory
committee began work on developing
recommendations on how to gather the
measurement data. 
In early May, 2006, a new report said
surging tax receipts – driven by a rising stock
market and business expansion – would create
a $5 billion windfall. The extra money would
allow the governor to restore education
funding, quieting his critics among teachers
and other education advocates. Proposition 49’s
tenure as a political pawn was over, for now.
The bill working its way through the
legislature would include many of the changes
advocates had been backing for years. Among
the provisions:
l Grant program, not a reimbursement-
based program, with streamlined
application procedures.
l Increase in daily afterschool rate from
$5 to $7.50 per student/per day. The
maximum per-school cap would rise to
$112,500 for elementary and $150,000 for
middle schools.
l Funding match decreases from half to
one-third.
l More funding for technical assistance to
providers in the field.
l The key outcomes and quality measures
would be attendance – both school-day
and program attendance. There would be a
supplementary menu of goals with the
legislature looking to the Advisory
Committee for guidance.
l Priority funding would be existing
programs, qualifying federal 21st Century
programs and schools with more than half
of their students receiving free and
reduced lunch. All other elementary and
middle schools would be judged based on
demonstrated need.
State funding for afterschool programs in
California was on track to increase from $120
million to $550 million. Fowler noted that you
would never get that kind of bump from the
Appropriations Committee.
And the political fight, now nearly over,
had pushed the afterschool agenda to a higher
plane.
“The flip side of having all of these
politicians argue about you is to be ignored,”
Fowler said. “It is messy, but we’re still poised
to be much further ahead on our agenda.”
Standards and Scale: June 22, 2006
On this steamy day in Sacramento, a
subcommittee of the Advisory committee
began to tackle this shortcoming identified in
the Design Team/BCG final report: “There is
no consistent guidance on essential
components of programs across the state.” 
Nearly four years after voters approved a
massive expansion of afterschool and a few
months before the money would flow, it would
be up to this group to begin to identify the
“essential components” of a quality program.
There would be a need to review existing
research on what it takes to operate a quality
program. “I don’t want to be in a bubble here,”
said subcommittee member Michael Funk, of
Sunset Neighborhood Beacon Center in San
Francisco, “drinking from my own punch.” 
Rigorous standards and accountability
measures were needed so the state could “scale
up” the program statewide while maintaining
quality. The standards need to be “robust for
use across the state,” said Malloy of CDE and
the Design Team.
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“What can we take
credit for 
and be held 
accountable for?”
STEVE AMICK
DESIGN TEAM MEMBER
Malloy pointed out that the standards and
measures also need to be scientifically reliable.
This is why the standardized tests are so
appealing.
As the discussion progressed, homework
completion became the example of an intuitive
measure. But the question remains: How do
you create a valid measure? For instance, what
does “completion” mean?
Homework completed? Homework
handed in to teachers? Homework completed –
at what level of completeness, accuracy and
quality?
The overall question to the group was this:
“What can we take credit for and be held
accountable for?” asked Amick.
Malloy made another critical point on
measures. “The audience needs to care about
them.”
l For the legislature, they need to be
“impressive to decision-makers,” Malloy
said.
l For school principals, they need to
“give that principal something to keep
that program going,” Malloy said. The
measures need to make the school’s
business office comfortable and to make
sure that the Proposition 49 demands are
not making an incursion into the school
district’s general fund.
l The community – teachers and parents
– need to care, too.
l And the kids, particularly at the middle
school age, need to care. “They vote with
their feet,” Amick said.
Finale: Aug. 9, 2006
On a sunny, breezy day in Sacramento it’s
the job of the Assembly Appropriations
Committee to do the final vetting of Senate
bills. Room 4202 is set up like a small-town
theater – a modest number of seats on the first
floor and about the same number in a balcony.
Large black-and-white photos of
California’s beauties – mountains, valleys and
waterways – hang on the walls. Up front, in
two rows, are places for the committee
members.
It is a place for business. This morning, the
pace will be quick. The hearing starts at 9 a.m.
There is plenty to do – 200 bills are on the
calendar – and the chairwoman is working
hard to move things along.
For most of the bills, this is the stop to
make sure all of the parties have worked out
the kinks. This is the final filter. So, most of
the business is pro forma.
“Do I have a second?” asks the chair. “Do
we have testimony in favor of the bill?”
“We support this bill,” says an advocate.
An opponent says the opposite. 
And the bill passes, ready for final passage
on to the Assembly floor.
There are a few moments of tension. For
some advocates, this is the last chance –
they’re already on the dreaded “suspension”
calendar, the holding tank for near-dead
legislation.
One afterschool bill, the Republican bill,
landed there.  
For advocates who have worked for years,
there is often a hint of desperation just below
the surface of polite discourse. The tip-offs are
the words – “unconscionable,”  “outrage,” “we
need to do something about this.”                       
But there’s no need for such rhetorical
excess today for the Democratic bill on
afterschool.                               
Sen. Torlakson steps to the podium and
says the magic words. “There has been a lot of
coming together” among advocates on the bill,
he says. His bill will make it easier to “get
money out the door” and there are
accountability measures, he tells his Assembly
colleagues.
A long line quickly forms behind
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Torlakson and the advocates step up and
introduce themselves and who they represent.
“Bay Area Partnership…Children Now…
School Age Consortium…Fight Crime: Invest
in Kids…LA’s BEST… Children’s Initiative in
San Diego…”
The vote is quick, like most of the
business today. The bill passes easily, and it
goes to the Assembly floor.
At the end of the month, on the last day of
the session, the bill passes the Assembly along
with hundreds of other bills.
Three weeks later, the governor signs the
bill.
Proposition 49 is ready for
implementation.
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While readers might draw many conclusions after reading thechronicle of how the Proposition 49 planning process unfolded,the commentary that follows frames four key areas for planners
in other states to consider.
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For years, advocates in California knew
that the system for distributing afterschool
funds needed to change. The Legislative
Analyst’s Office’s (LAO) unsparing report
confirmed it. New legislation was a critical
step.
These advocacy efforts, coupled with
research gathered by the consulting firm,
provide clear guideposts for afterschool
advocates and policy makers in other states.
Afterschool programs needed to be more
attractive to school administrators as well as to
the community-based organizations whose
subcontracts would allow them to operate
many programs. The first step was the size of
the grants and how they were handled. The
legislation signed by the governor:
l Replaced the reimbursement system
with a direct grant.
l Increased the caps and per student/per
day rates.
l Lowered the “match” of non-state
contributions of cash and in-kind services.
l Streamlined the application process and
provided the California Department of
Education (CDE) with more funds and
support to administer a soon to be rapidly
expanding program.
These changes would address the LAO
critique that when the afterschool program had
expanded in the past, more than half of the
funds were unspent. 
“The unused funding results from two
main factors – the reimbursement system and
budget and contracting delays,” said the LAO.
No one wants to “replicate that kind of
failure,” said Tim Erwin, a Design Team
member. 
The budget and contracting delays were a
long-time source of friction between the CDE
and program operators. The Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) stepped in to advise the CDE on
how to be more efficient, said Sue Stickel,
formerly of the CDE. The entire planning
process triggered an “enormous change in
culture to get things going and revved up.” To
Stickel, this was a telling example of that
change: two business days after the governor
signed the legislation, the request for proposals
went out to schools.
The CDE would also end up receiving the
authority to add 18 full-time employees, CDE’s
John Malloy said, raising the total number of
CDE people working on state and federally
funded afterschool programs to 40.
A more efficient CDE and the reforms in
the law would make it easier for school
administrators and school board members to
sign on. 
Larger grants would lessen the chance that
a school board would have to divert money
from other programs to help fund afterschool
programs, said Erwin, who runs afterschool
programs for the Newark School District, on
the east side of San Francisco Bay. At the old
rates of $5 per student/per day, “You’d have a
hard time selling it to your district,” he said.
To raise the rates to $7.50 per student/per
day, priorities had to be set. There wouldn’t be
enough money to offer a program to every
elementary and middle school. Existing
programs and programs in needy schools and
their contractors would get first crack at the
money. 
The betting is that schools in affluent
neighborhoods will not want to deal with the
restrictions, thus opting out of the program,
said Perry Chen, a consultant who monitored
the process. 
Ultimately, it is a ‘‘depth vs. breadth”
argument, Chen said. This approach will allow
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the program to go “deeper into the schools that
have the need” and was “a wise tradeoff.”
This tradeoff was a critical, strategic
decision. By targeting schools in poor
neighborhoods, the program would be far from
universal. But it would give the 1,400 schools
in poor neighborhoods identified in the
research by BCG the first shot at the money.
Identifying this large number of needy
schools without state-funded afterschool
programs was one of several key research tasks
tackled by BCG. CDE’s willingness to open its
files to the consulting firm’s analysts provided
many in the field with their deepest look into
the status of afterschool in the state.
BCG’s research-heavy presentations would
provide the grist for the work of the Design
Team. “BCG lifted a lot of information so that
people could see the reality in a very
fragmented world,’’ said Julene Perez-
Gonzalez, formerly of Packard.
Their readable analyses “allowed the team
members to make decisions based on clear,
hard facts,” said Cyndee Zandes of the Design
Team. “You can ask more and better
questions.”
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Summary: Advocacy efforts that had been going on long before Proposition 49 planning began
ensured that important changes were made to the afterschool program law to help make this
opportunity attractive to schools and their subcontractors. 
Research and analysis done by the consulting firm provided stakeholders across the state with
the clearest look yet at the state of the afterschool field. This step served to elevate the work of
planners and advocates.
Being armed with accurate, useful information is critical to effective advocacy and planning.
Planners in other states should note California’s successful effort to understand the lay of the land
and ensure the program was attractive to providers before jumping to the nuts and bolts of rollout.
While the level of financial investment in
afterschool in California is certainly unique,
taking a close look at the roster and
commitment of key partners is critical to any
afterschool expansion effort.  
To some in California, linking a group of
advocates, state officials and program operators
with a business consulting firm to do the
detailed planning work had a fresh appeal.
Others needed to be talked into going along. So
it is not surprising that as the planning
progressed, buy-in was uneven.
The key partner was the CDE, the main
education agency. It had the data and the
resources; the implementation of Proposition
49 was its responsibility. While many noted its
lukewarm attitude in the early days of
planning, CDE received in the end fairly good
marks from most for its engagement in the
process. The engagement of other principal
agencies – the Office of the Secretary of
Education and the Department of Finance –
was less intense.
One practical lesson that Scott Himelstein
drew from the experience was to gather “as
many partners as early as possible,’’ said the
former acting Secretary of Education. “There
are obvious benefits to engaging them early
and often.” But it is also important to look
beyond the “usual suspects” when considering
partnerships in afterschool.
When Himelstein’s boss, the governor,
launched the drive for Proposition 49 votes in
2002, he said the measure would “pay for itself
in reduced crime, welfare and child-care
costs,” the Los Angeles Times reported. While
the state’s justice and social services
communities provided important political
support for the passage of Proposition 49, they
were not part of the planning process. The
opinions of police chiefs, child care advocates
or key afterschool players like the Boys &
Girls Clubs were not solicited.   
While the alliance between the governor’s
office and the CDE was a significant step, the
afterschool community needs to capitalize on
opportunities to attract long-term, sustainable
partners to aid its cause.
As the planning process unfolded, some
advocates even wondered if the state’s main
education agency was the right place for
Proposition 49.
“This whole program is probably not a
good fit for education,” said Sam Piha, a
member of the Design Team. He said it might
be better in the juvenile justice sector or even
workforce development, particularly given the
job-training needs for this kind of expansion.
Perhaps the justice community could
become for the afterschool community the
partner that farmers became for child nutrition
advocates two generations ago.
In that case, two forces – those interested
in nutritious foods for kids and those interested
in stable prices for commodities – have
worked together to make sure lunch is a given
in every student’s school day.
No one quibbles that vegetables are an
indispensable part of good nutrition, said Steve
Amick, a member of the Design Team and the
Advisory Committee. But, in afterschool,
which provides safe havens and productive
activities, “we are still trying to prove that
vegetables are good for you.”
Sandy McBrayer, chair of the Steering and
Advisory groups, would like to see the creation
of an afterschool office with representatives
from the Justice, Education and Health and
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Investment: Strategic Partnerships 
and Early Buy-in
Human Services departments, as well as the
governor’s office. “Blended funding” from
each agency would spark new combinations
and ideas.
Requiring new police recruits to work in
afterschool programs as part of their
community service training, for instance,
would be “fascinating,” she said. It would also
be a way to break down stereotypes for two
groups often at odds – teens and cops.
Such alliances, armed with the hard data
BCG collected and crunched, could help press
the case that afterschool programs are
indispensable to students, parents and their
communities and schools.
In afterschool, “we don’t yet have the kind
of synergies we need with other powerful
political’’ interests, said Amick. 
This deficit hobbled efforts to get a key
stakeholder – the legislature – to support the
planning process.
The “pre-sell” of the planning idea,
including bringing in an outside consulting
firm, didn’t get the resources and attention it
needed to bring key legislative partners on
board.
Some legislative staffers attended early
Steering Committee meetings but their
participation was limited. Legislative slots on
the Advisory Committee remained unfilled for
months.
A skilled government relations manager
could have smoothed the legislative road a bit.
But some of the key players at the table –
foundations and BCG, for instance – didn’t
have the expertise or the responsibility to make
this happen. Indeed, private foundations like
the ones engaged in this planning process are
barred from engaging or supporting lobbying
activity.
Many involved in the process assumed
that the unified, non-partisan pact between the
governor and the superintendent’s offices
would translate into an effective voice in the
legislature; the politics of the special election
in November 2005 and K-12 education funding
negated that assumption.
Planners in other states who are
contemplating a similar expansion should think
carefully about how to ensure that the
legislature is informed and on board.
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Summary: It is critical to secure buy-in from as many key partners as possible, as early as
possible. In the case of California, the key partner was the California Department of Education, the
main state education agency. But it was also critical that other players like the Department of
Finance, the Office of the Secretary of Education and the legislature be on board and engaged. 
Deepening relationships with systems and organizations outside of education (e.g., juvenile
justice, workforce, public health) is a step many afterschool stakeholders in California have come to
consider critical. Planners in other states should consider whether education is necessarily the most
appropriate home for afterschool initiatives or whether a blended approach involving several public
funding streams could spark useful new synergies. 
 
The afterschool field in California, like in
other states, is fragmented. One of the inherent
values in pulling together program and policy
experts is increased communication and the
cross-pollination of ideas.
During the California experience, the
Design Team became just such a forum for a
fragmented field. “It was an opportunity for my
voice to be heard,” said Laurie Isham, a Design
Team member who operates programs in
Visalia, in California’s central valley, at a
forum in the fall of 2006. “I can’t emphasize
how important that is.”
To Julene Perez-Gonzalez, a former
program officer at the Packard Foundation, this
interaction was one of the “big gifts” in the
process.
For BCG executive Reggie Gilyard the
creation of the Design Team, where people
with different points of view could debate the
issues, was a key step worth repeating. “I
would highly recommend that for anyone who
is looking to replicate this process,” he said.
With many voices at the table, the Babel
quotient could have been high. But BCG was
able to focus the team and move forward
quickly in a short timeframe. “It was important
to have a neutral party with a lot of
management expertise,” to facilitate the
process, said Lindsay Callahan, a Design Team
member. 
While the consulting firm brought the
neutrality that Callahan speaks of to the day-to-
day facilitation, the foundation consortium
became a neutral hand in designing the
planning process. Substantial resources are
needed to do this kind of planning, and it is
easier to do this with private money than to
take the money from the program budgets.
“They did a very good job for this
purpose,” said Scott Himelstein, the former
acting Secretary of Education. “I think it was
great to have the foundations involved.”
Just as the California experience revealed
issues to replicate, there are other steps that
planners elsewhere would be wise to approach
differently.
When the planning started, there were two
groups – the Steering Committee of executives
focused on strategy, the Design Team focused
on operational details. The two groups did not
meet, creating a disconnect that helped foster
“unrealistic expectations of what we could
accomplish,” said Sandy McBrayer, chair of
the Steering Committee.
Communication was another area that
needed more attention. It was never clear who
was responsible for communication, both to the
field (internal) and to the public (external).
There was a need for a concrete conversation
on communication guidelines, McBrayer said.
For BCG, a single point of contact, or
champion, could have helped get quick and
coordinated responses as issues arose. That
didn’t happen, said Linda Segre, the former
BCG executive, leaving BCG out of the loop
on some critical issues like the political
negotiations on per student/per day rates.
Salisbury of Packard said, in retrospect, it
might have been wise to push harder for a
single state government point of contact for
BCG. A single voice on the state’s side of the
equation might have helped the process smooth
over a problem that popped up for BCG – the
first two project managers left the company
just as the project was getting underway. A
single point of contact might have been useful,
said Himelstein. “But it is hard to implement
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Group Dynamics: Utilizing Expertise 
and Recognizing Limitations
that in a practical sense” given the multiple
agencies involved.
There are two other related lessons that
planners elsewhere might want to contemplate;
both are connected to interactions outside the
immediate planning group.
The first point is understanding the
limitations of the planning group’s expertise
and when to reach outside the group for help;
the other is the importance of being cautious
about reaching into areas outside the
immediate planning group without the
necessary expertise and background.
The first limitation was revealed when a
BCG/Design Team’s recommendation got
some scrubbing.
Frank Pisi, a CDE consultant who was not
on the Design Team, was asked to review a
Funding Guide that included 29 recommended
sources for matching funds. In his review, Pisi
found that 13 of the programs either no longer
existed or would not be appropriate.
“While a well-intentioned effort, the
Funding Guide suffers from a lack of complete
information regarding funding and match
sources,” the Pisi presentation to the Advisory
committee said. “Unfortunately, given the lack
of information about the sources, and the
inclusion of sources that either no longer exist
or are not able to be used by … programs, as
match or otherwise, pursuing or using funding
from these sources can place programs in
precarious fiscal situations.”
This misstep could have been avoided if
the BCG/Design Team had asked for someone
from the CDE for help; the expertise obviously
was near at hand.
The second limitation was revealed by
BCG’s involvement in policies and politics. 
Many, including Sandy McBrayer, chair of the
Advisory Committee, and Scott Himelstein, the
former acting Secretary of Education, say the
firm overreached by mistaking the research it
had done for expertise in content areas like
afterschool program evaluation.
BCG executives, including Linda Segre,
counter that policy and politics are not their
areas of expertise and that they were not
responsible for political and policy questions.
Given the ease with which planning can
quickly morph into policy, and then politics,
planners in other states might want to consider
carefully the expertise of the planning group
and any outside advisors – and then be as clear
as possible about roles and responsibilities and
the scope of the work.
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Summary: Tapping expertise that exists within the state among providers, agencies and
advocates and combining that with outside advice proved to be a useful strategy in California. The
consulting firm’s research and facilitation skills complemented the expertise California stakeholders
brought to the table about the afterschool field, its history and the state context.
Clear communication and reporting lines can help ensure the success of bringing in external
advisors. Identifying early on the strengths and recognizing the limitations that each party brings to
the table is also important. 
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What does California wants to get out if its
substantial investment in afterschool? This
question might seem like a starting point for
planning discussions.
But it was one of the last questions to get
airtime – and the answer is still evolving. This
is partially the result of the political process. 
When voters approve a major afterschool
expansion they aren’t asked whether children
should learn piano or algebra or blow off steam
on the playground.
By letting a couple of years pass with no
long-range planning, the state missed an
opportunity to have a detailed conversation
about technical assistance, workforce
development and accountability – key drivers
of quality – well before there was a rush to
“get money out the door.”
Still, during the Proposition 49 planning
process, key stakeholders in California began a
long overdue, yet nuanced, conversation about
a question facing afterschool planners
elsewhere: What constitutes a quality program
and how do you create, sustain, monitor and
improve quality at scale?
The Design Team/BCG final report clearly
lays out the technical assistance and workforce
challenges for California (or any state) as it
gears up afterschool programs.
“The expansion of programs expected with
Proposition 49 funding makes addressing
existing weaknesses a critical priority,” the
report said. “Shortcomings in workforce supply
and gaps in technical assistance will be
particularly important in an environment of
vastly expanded programs.”
“Currently there is no central place to find
information on technical assistance including
timing and location of training and technical
assistance materials,” the report said.
Early on, BCG was advocating a “push”
mechanism to find programs that need
additional technical assistance. This would
replace the current system, where additional
help was provided only when a program
operator asked for it.
BCG recommended this “push system” as
part of a plan to provide better access to
information so CDE could more quickly
alleviate some management and administrative
problems.
Development of a statewide technical
assistance website would help improve staff
quality, along with a leadership mentoring
program and a statewide e-learning system, the
report said.
The Design Team/BCG saw the online
recruiting and marketing resource center as a
“quick win” to begin to address the “high
turnover ... due to relatively lower pay, the
part-time nature of most positions and the
transient nature of the young adults” that
plagues the field.
In the first couple of years of Proposition
49, the state would need to “maximize
potential workforce sources, increase the
attractiveness and value of an afterschool
career and organize select activities that will
increase retention of well-trained staff,” the
report said. 
In addition to recruiting, supporting and
retaining a qualified workforce, planners
grappled with the question of what outcomes to
hold programs accountable for and how to
measure them. In this context, the tension
between youth development aims, including
attracting disengaged students, and improving
academic test scores would color much of the
debate.
Lasting Value: Defining, Creating 
and Sustaining Quality Programs
Tracking academic improvement was
mandated by the existing law, so this was
CDE’s focus. The rationale for making test
scores one of the measures was linear. This
was education money, so it ought to be aligned
with one of the department’s major goals –
improving test scores. CDE’s John Malloy said
it most clearly: “This is how people judge our
work.”
Others on the Design Team argued that to
make afterschool programs accountable for test
scores was wrong-headed, at best – that was
the job of the schools. A better approach, said
Sam Piha, a member of the Design Team, was
this: How do you get “disengaged” kids
interested?
In a Design Team meeting, Piha led an
exercise that involved a different set of 3Rs to
talk about what was important in an afterschool
program.
l Relationships. What relationships are
built between adults and kids? Later,
Design Team member Steve Amick would
comment that “staffing is everything in
afterschool.”
l Relevance. How can you make this
different from school? Afterschool is a
youth-driven opportunity, Piha said; you
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Effective after-school programs in California share six (6) common
features of quality
Quality programs
positioned to deliver
outcomes
Meaningful participation
in engaging activities
Supportive relationships
with well-trained staff
Safe, nuturing
environment
Parental and community
involvement
Collaboration with 
school
Leadership &
administration
Variety of student-centered, enriching activities aligned with stated
outcomes; active student participation in activity creation and
operation; recreation and exploration of new ideas encouraged
Qualified staff dedicated to mentoring students and nurturing
positive relationships among participants; adequate training to
prepare and develop personnel
Sufficient, appropriate space for students to enjoy activities in safe,
healthy atmosphere; emotionally supportive and encouraging
environment that fosters learning and student development
Family activities that encourage parental support in program and
school; active partnerships that involve neighborhood and local
community
Regular communication and strong relationships with
superintendent, principal, teachers, staff, custodians, etc.;
sufficient resources dedicated to providing effective programs
Clear program goals; organized administrative support; shared
leadership with staff to encourage ownership, accountability,
collaboration and learning at all levels
Six key areas of quality Desired outcomes
improvement in:
Test scores
Behavior
indicators
Safety
Resiliency
Other?
Attendance
(school day and program)
Learning
development 
areas
Organizational
features
1
2
3
4
5
6
Adoption of the six key areas of quality will:
l Help to unify the field of existing after-school providers
l Guide new programs seeking direction
l Provide structure to program self-assessments
l Lead to improvements in the structural quality as well as the
processes used in afterschool programs
l Position programs to achieve desired outcomes
l Build strong partnerships between parents, communities and
schools
In its Master Plan, the Design Team and Boston Consulting Group identified key attributes of
quality afterschool programs
Source: Master Plan Final, April 17, 2006
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Summary: The planning process sparked a long overdue, nuanced conversation within the state
about the purpose of afterschool programming and about several key drivers of quality – technical
assistance, workforce development and accountability. 
Developing consensus about what constitutes quality and being clear about what capacity
currently exists when it comes to monitoring and improving quality at scale is critical. This evolving
conversation in California will ultimately determine whether Proposition 49 delivers on its full
promise.
can learn math cooking quesadillas.
l Rigor. Are the standards and the
expectations linked? CDE, to date, had
never turned down a program renewal if a
program didn’t meet standards. If there
are solid measures will “CDE be willing
to pull the plug?” Piha asked. Michael
Koerner, another Design Team member,
echoed that point during a Design Team
meeting: “Do we have the courage to not
support these activities in schools that
don’t meet the standards?”
The Design Team embraced a balanced
approach. “The resulting sentiment among the
team was that academic performance should be
one of the outcomes to be measured and
tracked, but other key outcomes should also be
included,” the Design Team/BCG report said.
“Pupil attendance (both for the school day and
the afterschool program), behavior indicators,
safety and resiliency are among the set of
outcomes the team strongly believes should be
measured and tracked.”
This approach would set a reasonable
expectation of what can be achieved by
afterschool programs, Piha said.
In the political compromise that emerged,
a program’s success will be measured by
program attendance and school-day attendance.
A list of student test scores will be included in
periodic reports, but only as a matter of
information.
The idea is to attract the kids who are most
likely going to attend the program, in order to
keep program attendance high. And in terms of
school-day attendance, the goal is to attract
students who are missing a fair amount of
school, so their school-day attendance numbers
move up.
This combination may work to limit the
“creaming” issue that concerns many –
programs specifically recruiting kids who are
already highly motivated and successful. 
The new legislation directed the Advisory
Committee to recommend a menu of other
measures that could be used, statewide, to
determine program effectiveness. This work is
ongoing.
“The process began with a mission and
vision statement that guided
recommendations across the remaining
Master Plan elements. Eight 
recommendations, which are considered
high priority and actionable, were selected
out of a total of 19 recommendations.
These high priority recommendations will
have significant impact on improving the
afterschool system and delivering the
aspirations of the mission and vision
statements. Some recommendations are
actionable within the next four-to-six
months, whereas others require a longer
time horizon to implement. The priority
recommendations are underlined in the list
of recommendations below.”
Mission and Vision: Mission and vision
statements will unite the afterschool
community and provide a beacon to guide
programs. 
1. Adopt the mission statement for
afterschool in California and vision
statement for 2015
Management and Administration: Effective
management and administration of an
enlarged afterschool system can be
significantly improved by four key
recommendations:
2. Improve database management and
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Summary of Key Recommendations
“California Kids Deserve the After-School Advantage”
All California children and youth shall have access to engaging, high-quality,
student centered after-school programs by 2015
Supporting California children and youth to be safer, healthier and more successful through:
l Emotionally and physically nurturing environments
l Enhanced connections with families, schools and communities
l Enhanced academic excellence and improved literacy
l Engaging enrichment opportunities
l Expanded efforts to ensure student success in school and life
With equitable access to high quality, student-centered after-school programs that:
l Inspire kids to make positive choices
l Build character, leadership and teamwork capabilities, and self esteem
l Contribute to the development of positive peer relationships and connections 
between young people and caring adults in well supervised and secure settings 
to engender a sense of belonging
l Develop and strength collaboration between community partners and schools to 
deliver high quality services
l Build upon existing schools, communities and public resources to enable 
measurable success
Mission
Statement
Vision
Statement
Source: Master Plan Final, April 17, 2006
The Design Team and the Boston Consulting Group submitted its final report – Master
Plan for California After School – to the Before & After School Advisory Committee in May
2006. What follows is a summary of their key recommendations. Their report said:
 
access to information at CDE
3. Build an executive management
dashboard to evaluate progress 
4. Review the Statewide System of
Field Support, with specific effort to
optimize the Regional Lead system 
5. Increase communication and
collaboration between public and
private groups
Operating Plan: In order to maintain a
functional system of quality afterschool
programs, a few key operational actions
should be undertaken. 
6. Adopt a statewide definition of a
quality afterschool program and
propose systematic semi-annual self
assessments (the ‘Quality’ initiative)
7. Promote strong collaboration
between schools and programs to
secure critical site-level operational
fundamentals, such as physical space
and safety
Workforce: The team’s workforce
recommendations have been divided into
those focused on staff quality and those
focused on staff development and retention
strategies.
Staff quality: Three recommendations
address training issues facing California’s
afterschool programs:
8. Develop a leadership mentoring 
program
9. Develop statewide e-learning
system
10. Develop a statewide technical
assistance website
Staff development and retention: Although
there is one quick win, most
recommendations will require some time to
achieve.  Over the next four to six months,
it is most important to:
11. Develop online recruiting and
marketing resource center 
And, over the next one to two years,
three recommendations will institute
changes that will have more long-
lasting impact:
12. Maximize potential workforce
sources
13. Increase the attractiveness and
value of an afterschool career
14. Organize select activities that will
increase retention of well-trained staff
Financial Plan: In order to provide the tools
and support infrastructure for securing
match funding, the team proposes three
recommendations.  It is critical to distribute
the fundraising guide as soon as possible for
the guide to be valuable in the upcoming
school year. The consortium operating
model, which requires efforts from Regional
Leads to promote and develop the model,
could have near-term impact for small and
rural programs most in need of assistance.
These two nearer term recommendations
will ensure that programs have the tools that
are essential for creating sustainable
afterschool opportunities. 
15. Distribute the fundraising guide
that was developed during the Master
Planning Process
16. Create a centralized funding pool
organization
17. Promote and develop proven
consortium operating models 
Execution Plan: Timely implementation of
the recommendations requires a strategy for
coordinating efforts and ensuring success.
The following recommendations comprise
an effective execution plan:
18. Implement recommendations in an
organized, timely fashion, according to
provided work plans
19. Ensure sufficient resources for each
recommendation
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Source: Master Plan Final, April 17, 2006
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The full Master Plan can be found at the Packard Foundation website http://www.packard.org. To
access the plan, go to the Children, Families, and Communities page in the section What We Fund,
and click through to After-School Programs for Children and Youth.
Notes:
The after school bill that eventually passed was Senate Bill 638. California legislative action can be
viewed at: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ To review, go to Bill Information and then search under
2005/2006 session. 
